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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,

*
*

Plaintiff/Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
*

v.

*

ANTONY DAVIS,

*

Case No. 20090816-SC

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
Defendant filed a Motion for Funds in order to obtain a medical expert and a
private investigator to adequately prepare his defense. The trial court denied the motion
on September 22, 2009. This appeal is taken from Defendant's Motion for Funds, which
was denied by the Honorable Judge Vernise Trease of the Third District Court.
Jurisdiction to hear this case is conferred upon the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in requiring Defendant to show there was a
compelling reason to require Salt Lake County to pay for a private
investigator and medical expert?
Standard of Review. The question of whether the compelling reason

standard applies is a matter of statutory interpretation, and an appellate
court must review a trial court's statutory interpretation for correctness.
State v. Bums, 200 UT 56, f 15, 4 P.3d 795.
2.

Did the trial court err in requiring Defendant to be represented by LDA in
order to qualify for receiving funding from Salt Lake County?
Standard of Review. The question of whether a trial court can require a
Defendant to accept LDA counsel in order to qualify for other state/county
funded assistance for a private investigator or an expert is a matter of
statutory interpretation, and an appellate court must review a trial court's
statutory interpretation for correctness. State v. Burns, Id.

CITATION TO THE RECORD PRESERVING ISSUES FOR APPEAL
Defendant filed a Motion for Funds, asking the trial court to order Salt
Lake County to provide him funds in order to hire a medical expert and a private
investigator to prepare his defense. The trial court entered a ruling on that very
issue.
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The defendant identifies the following constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances and rules as those "whose interpretation is determinative" within the
meaning of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6):

U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or the indictment
2

of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.

U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
UTAH CONSTIUTION AMENDMENT VII
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
UTAH CONSTIUTION AMENDMENT XII
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel.. .
RULE 15(a) UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The court may appoint any expert witness agreed upon by Ihe
parties or of its own selection. An expert so appointed shall be informed of
his duties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed. An expert
so appointed shall advise the court and the parties of his findings and may
thereafter be called to testify by the court or by any party. He shall be
subject to cross-examination by each party. He shall be subject to crossexamination by each party. The court shall determine the reasonable
compensation of the expert and direct payment thereof. The parties may
call expert witnesses of their own at their own expense. Upon showing that
a defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of an expert whose services
are necessary for adequate defense, the witness fee shall be paid as if he
were called on behalf of the prosecution.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant was charged with Rape of a Child and Aggravated Sex Abuse
of a Child, first degree felonies. Defendant first appeared in court on January
27, 2009, and the Court found him indigent and appointed an attorney from
the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association (LDA) to represent him. Under
the advice of his appointed counsel, Defendant waived his right to a
preliminary hearing and an arraignment hearing was scheduled. The
arraignment was held on March 27, 2009, and Defendant pleaded not-guilty
and the case was set for trial for June 9, 2009.

Defendant began to lose

confidence in his appointed counsel since he continuously requested he take a
polygraph examination and questioned his claims of innocence. TCFF TJ5.
As such, his family retained private counsel, Sean B. Druyon, on May 13,
2009. TCFF, %4. His new counsel recommended a medical expert and a
private investigator to aid in the Defendant's defense. However, Defendant
remained indigent and all funds from the family had been depleted. As such,
Defendant filed a Motion for Funds on June 19, 2009. TCFF ^|4. Defendant's
Motion for Funds was heard on August 18, 2009, but was denied. At that
hearing, Defendant was not prepared to address the compelling reason
standard since he did not think it applied because he was not seeking for an
order requiring Salt Lake County or Legal Defender's Association to provide
funds for non-contracting defense resources under Utah Code §77-32-302(e).
HT, p. 20, lines 14-15. Defendant asked the court under the Indigent Defense
4

Act to order LDA to provide the experts he requested. Notwithstanding Utah
Code § 77-32-302(2)(b), the trial court found it did not have a legal basis for
ordering LDA to do anything since LDA had a contract with Salt Lake
County, and that Salt Lake County was required, by statute, to provide
defense resources to indigent defendants. TCCL ]f4. The trial court also
found that Defendant had failed to state a compelling reason under Utah Code
§ 77-32-302 (2)(e). TCCL ^|2. The trial court found as a matter of law that
unless Mr. Davis demonstrates a compelling reason, Salt Lake County would
not be statutorily obligated to provide him with any defense resources. TCCL
T|4. Defendant timely filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal the
Interlocutory Order, of which this Court granted.
ARGUMENTS
OVERVIEW OF LEGAL STANDARDS
The United States Constitution Requires that an Accused shall have the Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel which Includes Necessary Defense Resources in Order to Prepare
a Complete Defense.
The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall...
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. Amend. VI. This means that
"[c]ounsel must be furnished to an indigent defendant in federal court in every case,
whatever the circumstances." Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 136-37, 67 S.Ct. 1716, 91
L.Ed. 1955 (1947). The right to assistance of counsel for criminal defendants is a
fundamental right of due process and thereby applicable to the states by way of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335, 339-45, 83 S.Ct. 792,
5

9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The Utah Const. Amend. VII provides that "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Further Utah Const.
Amend. XII states that "(i)n criminal prosecution the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend....by counsel...." Utah Const. Amen. XII. Furthermore, the United
States Supreme Court has held in several cases that the Fourteenth Amendment right to
due process means that this right to counsel includes effective assistance of counsel.
See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-97, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821
(1985)(effective assistance also applies at appellate level); Cuyler v. Sullivaa 446 U.S.
335, 344, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (guarantee of effective assistance means
indigents must be afforded adequate legal assistance); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 8990, 76 S.Ct. 167, 100 L.Ed. 77 (1955) (assignment of counsel after indictment was not
effective assistance of counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-73, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77
L.Ed. 158 (1932) (trial judge's general appointment of "all members of the bar" for
arraignment and then failure to appoint counsel for trial was not effective assistance of
counsel).

In furtherance of this premise, the Supreme Court in Britt v. North Carolina held
that as a matter of equal protection, a state must "provide indigent prisoners with the
basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to
other prisoners." 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d400 (1971); see also Akev.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) (holding that to

provide effective defense, indigent defendants must have access to basic tools of
defense).
Utah's Indigent Defense Act is a Response to Gideon and its Progeny
Utah's Indigent Defense Act is a response to Gideon and its progeny. In State v.
Burns, 2000 Utah 56, 4 P.3d 795, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[i]t is this line of
decisions by the United States Supreme Court that prompted states to implement acts
such as the Utah Indigent Defense Act (the "Act") to ensure that the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel includes access for indigents to the basic tools of
defense." I4at^|24.

This Court has already Ruled that the Utah Indigent Defense Act only Requires an
Indigent Defendant to Establish Indigency and Necessity in Order to Qualify for
County Funds.
A defendant seeking county funds for obtaining legal counsel and necessary
defense resources need only demonstrate indigency and necessity. Burns, supra, at TJ32.
Burns is a case very similar to the present case. In Burns, defendant was initially
appointed counsel due to indigency. Later Burns's father retained private counsel for her
and they motioned the court for an expert since her father did not have the financial
resources to retain the expert. The trial court denied her motion for an expert, ruling that
she was required to have LDA counsel, not private counsel, in order to qualify for this
assistance. In that case, Defendant's motion for appointment of expert was heaird on
April 10, 1992. At that time, the Act provided:
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The following are minimum standards to be provided by each county, city
and town for the defense of indigent persons in criminal cases in the courts
and various administrative bodies of the state:
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial
probability of the deprivation of his liberty;
(2) Afford timely representation by competent legal counsel;
(3) Provide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete
defense;
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; and
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and the prosecuting of other
remedies before or after a conviction, considered by the defending counsel
to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent discretionary
appeals or discretionary writ proceedings.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (1990) (enacted by Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, ch. 15,
§ 2, 1980 Utah Laws 110, 209 (amended 1983)) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 7732-301 (Supp. 1999)). In addition, the Act provided that the

[g]overning bodies of counties, cities and towns shall either:
(1) Authorize the court to provide the services prescribed by this chapter by
appointing a qualified attorney in each case and awarding him reasonable
compensation and expenses to be paid by the appropriate governing body;
or
(2) Arrange to provide those services through non-profit legal aid or other
associations.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-6 (1990) (enacted by Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, ch. 15,
§ 2, 1980 Utah Laws 110, 209) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-306 (Supp.
1999)). Thus, § 77-32-1 separately listed five requirements that were the minimum
standards a county had to provide to an indigent defendant. Additionally, § 77-32-6
allowed a county two options for providing those minimum standards. See
also Washington County v. Day. 22 Utah 2d 6, 10, 447 P.2d 189, 192 (1968) (holding
that section one obligates county to furnish minimum standards and section six provides
two options for providing standards).
8

Burns argued that nothing in § 77-32-1 conditioned expert assistance on the
appointment of state-funded counsel. The minimum standards available to an indigent
defendant at that time were listed in § 77-32-1 as five discrete subsections. This was an
indication that the right to counsel stood separate and distinct from the right to the
"investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense." This Court held that

it is clear from the plain language of that section that a county must
"[p]rovide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete
defense" to every indigent person, not just to those represented by the LDA.
There is nothing in the section that conditions availability of these basic
tools of defense on acceptance of LDA counsel. Instead, under the plain
language of section 77-32-1, the only deciding factors of eligibility for this
type of assistance are that the defendant in a criminal case be indigent and
that the investigatory and other facilities be necessary to a complete
defense.
Id. at ^j28.
This Court went on to note that in interpreting statutes, a court's primary goal should be
to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. See Evans v State,
963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). We need look beyond the plain language
only if we find some ambiguity. See id. "In analyzing a statute's plain
language, we must attempt to give each part of the provision a relevant and
independent meaning so as to give effect to all of its terms." V-l Oil Co. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906, 917 (Utah 1997). However, if we find a
provision that causes doubt or uncertainty in its application, we must
"analyze the act in its entirety and "harmonize its provisions in accordance
with the legislative intent and purpose.'" Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge
#7743,854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993) (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life &
Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)). Nevertheless, a statute's
unambiguous language "may not be interpreted to contradict its plain
meaning." Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asav.932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997).
The State argued, however, that § 77-32-6 should be read to provide that the
"investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense" need be furnished to
9

an indigent defendant only if the LDA is representing that defendant. To resolve the
State's contention, the court analyzed the Act in its entirety in an attempt to harmonize
§ 77-32-6 and § 77-32-1 in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose of
providing indigents with access to the basic tools of defense. In doing so, this Court noted
that "the unambiguous language of § 77-32-1 may not be interpreted to contradict its
plain meaning." Id. at f29. § 77-32-6 provided that a county may set up a nonprofit
legal aid association to provide the minimum required services or authorize the court to
appoint such services. However, this Court noted that:

that section cannot be read to mandate the packaging of indigent assistance
with LDA representation. To suggest, as the State does, that only those
indigents represented by LDA are eligible for the minimum services would
be a direct contradiction of the plain meaning of section 77-32-1 as well as
the legislative purpose of providing indigents with the basic tools of
defense. In fact, contrary to its argument, the State indicated at oral
argument that an indigent defendant proceeding pro se who has declined
standby counsel from the LDA would be able to acquire funding for expert
assistance. See generally State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,ffi[9,35, 979 P.2d
799 (indigent defendant refused LDA counsel and proceeded pro se but had
independent expert witness to testify at hearing).
Id. at Tffl 29-31. This Court also found persuasive Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure:
" [u]pon showing that a defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of an
expert whose services are necessary for adequate defense, the witness fee
shall be paid as if he were called on behalf of the prosecution." Utah
R.Crim. P. 15(a). There is no indication in this rule that a defendant must be
represented by LDA to qualify for this assistance. Instead, the only
prerequisites for eligibility are financial inability to pay and necessity for an
adequate defense.
It follows, therefore, that the only requirements for receiving public
assistance for expert witnesses are proof of necessity and establishment of
indigence.
10

Id. atfflf30-32 (footnotes eliminated).
The Amended Utah Indigent Defense Act does not Change a Defendant's
Constitutional Right to the Basic Tools for an Adequate Defense.
Defendant/Appellant acknowledges that the Utah Indigent Defense Act has been
amended since Burns. However, the amended Act still does not condition funding for
necessary defense resources on having LDA representation; it simply now requires a
Defendant to demonstrate a compelling reason if s/he either seeks funding for a noncontracting attorney or for a non-contracting defense resource. This was reaffirmed in
State v. Barber 206 P.3d 1223, (Utah Ct. App. 2009). In Barber, the Utah Court of
Appeals held that a private attorney who failed to interview a medical expert because the
defendant lacked the funds to hire this expert had failed the first prong of the ineffective
assistance of counsel test and was, thus, deficient in his representation because he could
have motioned the court for an order requiring Salt Lake County to pay for those funds
under Rule 15 (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id, at ^ 20-21. Barber makes
it clear that an indigent defendant need not have LDA representation in order to access
funds for necessary defense resources.
ARGUMENT I
The Trial Court Misapplied the "Compelling Reason" Standard
The trial court held that Defendant failed to establish that there were
compelling reasons to justify ordering Salt Lake County to pay for defense
resources for Defendant/Appellant and, consequently, denied Defendant's
Motion for Funds. However, Defendant need not meet the compelling reason
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standard unless he is seeking Salt Lake County to pay for either 1) his private
counsel, or 2) a private investigator or medical expert that are outside those
contracted for by LDA. In the present case, Defendant does not seek county
funds to pay for his private counsel; nor does he seek county funds to pay for a
private investigator or medical expert that he would not be entitled to should an
LDA appointed attorney be representing him.
Utah Code § 77-32-301 states the minimum standards for defense as
an indigent:
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of an
indigent in criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of
the state in accordance with the following minimum standards:
(1) provide counsel for each indigent who faces the substantial
probability of the deprivation of the indigent's liberty;
(2) afford timely representation by competent legal counsel;
(3) provide the investigatory resources necessary for a complete
defense;
(4) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client;
(5) proceed with a first appeal of right; and
(6) prosecute other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by
defense counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and
subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings.
Utah Code § 77-32-301(emphasis added).

It is clear that the Utah Indigent Defense Act requires Salt Lake County to
provide, at a minimum, counsel as well as investigatory resources necessary for
a complete defense. The trial court has already found Defendant/Appellant to
be indigent and the indigency determination is not contested for the purposes of
this appeal. The next inquiry should have been whether Defendant's requested
resources are necessary for an adequate or complete defense. However, rather
12

than rule on this the trial court erroneously found that Defendant/Appellant had
not met the compelling reason standard under Utah Code § 77-32-302 (b) and
(e). See HT, p. 19, lines 6-8, and TCCL, ^]2.
Utah Code § 77-32-302 (2)(b) and (e) state:
(b) If the county or municipality responsible to provide for the legal
defense of an indigent, including defense resources and counsel, has
arranged by contract to provide those services through a legal aid
association, and the court has received notice or a copy of the contract, the
court shall assign the legal aid association named in the contract to
defend the indigent and provide defense resources. ...
(e) If the court considers the assignment of a noncontracting
attorney or defense resource to provide legal services to an indigent
defendant despite the existence of an indigent legal services contract and
the court has a copy or notice of the contract, before the court may make
the assignment, it shall:
(i) set the matter for a hearing;
(ii) give proper notice of the hearing to the attorney of the responsible
county or municipality; and
(iii) make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a
noncontracting attorney or defense resource.
Utah Code § 77-32-302 (2)(b) and (e)(emphasis added). See also
Utah Code §77-32-3-3.
Subsection (b) requires the Court to assign the Legal Defender's
Association (LDA) to defend the indigent and provide defense resources if the
County has a contract with LDA to provide these services. This was initially
done when Defendant/Appellant was first arraigned. Subsequent to this,
however, Defendant became dissatisfied with his appointed counsel and his
family pooled resources and retained new counsel. The trial court then
erroneously ruled that since Defendant/Appellant had private counsel, under
13

subsection (e), Defendant was required to demonstrate a compelling reason in
order for the court to order Salt Lake County to pay for any defense resources
Defendant/Appellant was asking for.
In the present case Defendant/Appellant does not seek funding for a noncontracting attorney or for a non-contracting defense resource. Defendant
merely seeks to retain a private investigator and medical expert LDA would
have used had they been representing him. Should one of these experts or
investigators that is utilized by the LDA prove to not be adequate for Defendant
to prepare a complete defense, then he will motion the court for such and
demonstrate his compelling reasons at that time. But this is not anticipated at
present and, until that happens, Utah Code § 77-32-302 (2)(e) or §77-32-303 do
not apply to the case at bar. As such, the trial court incorrectly applied the
"compelling reason" standard as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT II
An Indigent Defendant is not Required to be
Represented by LDA in Order to Have Access to
Salt Lake County Funds for Experts and
Investigators
Nothing in Utah's Indigent Defense Act requires a defendant to be represented by
LDA in order to have access to county funds for necessary defense resources. In fact,
this very Court held in State v. Burns, 2000 Utah 56, 4 P.3d 795, that:

Section 77-32-6 [the Utah Indigent Act—prior to its current version]
provides that a county may set up a nonprofit legal aid association to
provide the minimum required services or authorize the court to appoint
such services. However, this section cannot be read to mandate the
14

packaging of indigent assistance with LDA representation. To suggest,
as the State does, that only those indigents represented by LDA are
eligible for the minimum services would be a direct contradiction of the
plain meaning of section 77-32-1 as well as the legislative purpose of
providing indigents with the basic tools of defense. In fact, contrary to
its argument, the State indicated at oral argument that an indigent defendant
proceeding pro se who has declined standby counsel from the LDA would
be able to acquire funding for expert assistance. See generally State v.
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,ffi[9,35, 979 P.2d 799 (indigent defendant refused
LDA counsel and proceeded pro se but had independent expert witness to
testify at hearing)(italics added on the term pro se, twice, and bold
emphasis added).
Burns, supra, at f30. And, as discussed above, although the Utah Indigent Defense Act
was amended post Burns, nothing in the amended Act specifically requires a defendant to
have LDA in order to qualify for Salt Lake County funds for necessary defense resources.
In fact, State v. Barber, supra, specifically held that a private attorney was deficient in his
representation when he failed to seek funds for an expert since Rule 15 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure permit an indigent defendant to have such funding for necessary
experts even when the defendant is being represented by private counsel. IdL at ^ 20-21.
It is telling that the court did not make any requirement that defendant show compelling
reasons to request an expert.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court was wrong in denying his Motion for Funds, Mr.
Davis asks this Court reverse the trial court's order and find that the compelling
reason standard does not apply since the Defendant/Appellant, Mr. Davis, is not
seeking county funds for either a noncontracting attorney or a noncontracting defense
resource. As such, Defendant respectfully requests this Court remand the case to the
15

trial court in order for Mr. Davis to demonstrate that his request for a private
investigator and a medical doctor are necessary to a complete defense under the Sixth
Amendment of the Utah and United States Constitutions.

2010.

DATED this I p day of

NATjADffi BRAEGGER
FOR SEAN B. DRUYON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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HEARING TRANSCRIPT (HT)

-1IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 091900484 FS

vs.
ANTONY DAVIS,
Defendant,

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
August 18, 2009
BEFORE:. THE HONORABLE VERNICE TREASE
Third District Court Judge
APPEARANCES
For the State:

Scott R. Wanqscrar.d
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

For the Defendant:

Sean B. Druvon
DRUYON LAW OFFICE
503 West 2600 South, Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801)397-2223

For Legal Defenders:

Patrick Anderson
LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-5444

Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT
1771 South California Avenue
Provo, Utah 84 606
Telephone: (801) 377-2927
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1

case, that would be something that I think would be relevant

2

for consideration of the Court.

3 I

So just so that I am clear on the record, although,

4

Mr, Druyon you indicate at this hearing and in your reply that

5

you are not requesting that the County directly pay for the

6

resources, and therefore 302 —

7

I do want to make this statement for the record.

8

regards to that section, we have had a hearing today.

9

was given to the County, and they replied, as well as Salt Lake

77-32-302(e) is not relevant,
That is, in
Notice

10

Legal Defenders out of courtesy.

That under the definition of

11

what is a compelling reason, the defendant has not provided

12

MR. DRUYON: May I address that briefly?

13

THE COURT: Sure.

14

MR. DRUYON: Because I didn't think we would need to

15

go into that, but let me just address that briefly.

16

represents that in the first few months of his incarceration

17

and when these charges were filed, that he had a conflict of

18

interest with the attorney that he was being represented by,

19

in that the attorney met with him just —

20

MR. DAVIS: Once, I think.

21

MR. DRUYON: —

—

Mr. Davis

was it twice?

once, and during that discussion the

22

defendant wanted to discuss with the attorney his defenses,

23

and possible motives for the mother to coach the alleged victim

24

daughter in this case.

25

Mr. Davis has represented to me —

Those discussions were cut short, and
and I don't know if it's

TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER (FFCL)

LOHRA L. MILLER (#6420)
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
T.J. TSAKALOS (#3289)
JEFF THORPE (#3256)
CRAIG WANGSGARD (#6052)
Deputy District Attorneys
2001 South State Street, #S3600
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-3421
Facsimile: (801) 468-2622

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER REGARDING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR FUNDS

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

ANTONY DAVIS,
:
Defendant.

Case No. 091900484
Judge Vernice Trease

A hearing was held before the Honorable Judge Vernice Trease on August 18, 2009, at
the hour of 2:00 P.M. Said hearing was on Defendant's MOTION FOR FUNDS. Deputy
District Attorney Craig Wangsgard represented Salt Lake County. Sean B. Druyon represented
defendant Antony Davis. Patrick Anderson represented Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association
("LDA"). Based on proffers of Mr. Druyon, review of the pleadings and other good cause
appearing, this Court finds as follows:

FINDINGS:
1.

This Court has previously found Mr. Davis indigent.

2.

On June 8, 2009, Mr. Davis filed a Motion for Funds requesting LDA be ordered to
pay for his expert witnesses or in the alternative find a compelling reason warranting
Salt Lake County being ordered to pay for noncontracting defense resources.

3.

Although LDA was previously appointed to defend Mr. Davis, Mr. Davis chose to
hire Mr. Druyon as his private counsel.

4.

Twenty-five days after filing Mr. Druyon's notice of appearance, Defendant filed his
Motion for Funds.

5.

Mr. Druyon proffered that Mr. Davis' previously appointed Counsel requested a lie
detector examination and failed to listen to Mr. Davis' claims of innocence, therefore
Mr. Davis lost confidence in the LDA,

6.

Mr. Wangsgard on behalf of Salt Lake County and Mr. Anderson on behalf of LDA,
consented to the admission of Mr. Druyon's proffers of evidence.

7.

Patrick Anderson, director, of LDA, stated that had Mr. Davis requested a different
LDA attorney, he would have evaluated the alleged conflict and if warranted would
have assigned a different attorney.

8.

If a legal conflict of interest existed, Mr. Anderson stated that LDA would have
assigned Mr. Davis5 case to Conflict Counsel, as require by its contract with Salt
Lake County.

9.

Legal Defenders Association is available to represent Mr. Davis and LDA has no

2

legal conflict of interest in this matter.
10.

LDA has the expertise and defense resources to provide an effective defense of Mr.
Davis.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

1.

Mr. Davis has failed to state a legal basis for ordering LDA to pay for his experts,

2.

Mr. Davis has failed to state a "compelling reason," as required by Utah Code Ann.
Sec. 77-32-302(2)(e), to appoint a noncontracting attorney or defense resource.

3.

Mr. Davis' preference for Mr. Druyon is not a compelling reason to warrant
appointment of a noncontracting defense resource.

4.

Without a compelling reason, Salt Lake County is not statutorily obligated to provide
Mr. Davis with non-contracting defense resources such as expert witnesses.
ORDER

1.

Based on the findings of facts and conclusions of law as stated herein, Mr. Davis'
Motion for Funds is hereby denied.
DATED this

day of

, 2009.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE VERNICE TREASE
Third District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TOJORM

APPROVEDASJCO FORM

con

con
Sean B. Druyon, Attorney for Defendant

Patrick Anderson, Attorney for LDA
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